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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Pursuant to Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by order 
entered April 11, 1988. 
Appeal has been taken from the Third District Court 
judgment which determined that the defendants Richard C. Bennion 
("Bennion"), Commerce Properties, Inc. ("Commerce"), John A. Hall 
("Hall"), and Process Instruments & Control, Inc. ("PIC"), were 
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff Vernon E. Bush 
("Bush") for an amount relating to architectural services 
rendered. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did Bennion and Commerce waive or are they 
otherwise estopped from asserting by this appeal any exception or 
objection to a conclusion of law by the trial court? 
2. Does Section 48-1-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended, have application to a joint venture? 
3. Do the Findings of Fact and other evidence sustain 
the conclusion of law that Bennion/Commerce and Hall/PIC are each 
liable for fifty percent (50%) of the amount awarded to the 
plaintiff? 
4. Is the appeal taken by Bennion and Commerce 
frivolous or without merit? 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTK8 AND RULES 
Issue numbers 2 and 3 above may be determined by 
interpretation of the following Utah statutes: 
48-1-3. "Partnership" defined. A partnership is an 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a 
business for profit. . . . 
48-1-3.1. Joint Venture defined-Application of chapter. 
(1) A joint venture is an association of two 
or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a single 
business enterprise. 
(2) This chapter governs the property and 
transfer rights for joint ventures. 
48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of 
partners. The rights and duties of the partners in 
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relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject 
to any agreement between them, by the following rules: 
(1) Each partner . . . must contribute 
towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, 
sustained by the partnership according to his share I n 
the profit. . . . 
Issue number 4 above may be determined by 
interpretation of the fol 1 owing Rule of; the Utah Court of 
Appeals: 
Rul e 33. Damages for del ay ';* r f ir t ¥ o ,1 o i j s a p p e a 1 r 
recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. 
If the Court determines that a motion made or an appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double 
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to the 
prevailing party . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Bush sought to recover from Benrii • :>i I, Commerce, H«i i 1 arid 
PIC fon i1: lie - M III" ot; architectural services rendered. The 
services were provided in connection with proposed building to 
be constructed m, in In Hitii n ommen/e as sales 
a g e n t ) , and leased by Hall to PIC vho tri il court entered 
judgment in favoir of Bush and against Bennion, Commerce, Ha] ] ai i< :i 
PIC, jointl y ai id se vex a 1 1 y , i i I he sum ot Tib irteen Thousand 
Dollars ($13,000.00), plus interest and costs. 
Bennion and Commerce appeal from til • ti m l i oui t 
u-;.^ Bennion and Commerce, jointly, should pay 
fifty percent, i ;,o%; \:u- judgment debt and that Hal- <; - >IC, 
jointly, shot fj ft .y percei it (50%) < : ^f - udgment 
debt. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In July, 1984, Bennion contacted Bush and discussed a 
potential project involving the construction of a commercial 
office building. (R. 26) . Subsequently, Bennion instructed Bush 
to prepare preliminary drawings for the project. (R. 29) 
Bennion is the principal owner of Commerce (R. 153). 
Hall is the principal owner of PIC. By Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement dated June 28, 1985, (Exhibit "D-ll"), Bennion agreed 
to sell to Hall the subject property improved by a building 
described in plans and specifications annexed thereto. The 
Agreement was subject to the condition that Hall would obtain an 
appropriate loan within sixty (60) days from the date thereof, 
which condition was not satisfied. (Finding 8). 
If the sale had been closed, Commerce would have 
received a commission equal to ten percent (10%) of the sales 
price. The sales price was defined by the parties as the project 
cost* (p. 92) . The trial court found that Bennion/Commerce and 
Hall/PIC were involved in a joint venture from which 
Bennion/Commerce would ultimately earn ten percent (10%) of the 
total cost of the joint venture project. (Finding 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bennion and Commerce are subject to the doctrines of 
waiver or estoppel by virtue of their failure to have timely 
objected to any Conclusion of Law by the trial court. Any 
exception to a Conclusion should have been brought before the 
trial court with an opportunity granted to it to make any 
required correction. 
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A joint ventu f o m i i not a pa ot norsh 11,» and except i n 
certain situations, Is not to be treated as one The provisions 
of the Utah Partnership Act cited ^1 unv appellants have no 
a pp 11 c a 11 o 11 f 11« i 111 111 v o 111 u i e, including the j oint venture which 
is the subject of this appeal. 
There is sufficient evidence ! o /uippoi t, the Conclusion 
ot Law that Bennion/Commerce are liable for at least fifty 
percent (50%) ! t.no judgment debt* It is improper to analyze 
t h e •: . .• •'*- tJ i K • • r o -lerce by reference to 
"profits.11 Such analysis should focus only upon the concept of 
"cost" • Since these terms are not equivalent, statu ites dea 1 i ng 
w i t. h " p r o f i t" < m ir •» i r t e I e v a n t t o ti h is ^^ <=« M o r e o v e r , e v e n if a 
discussion of "profit" was relevant absent an agreement 
regarding the allocate on of p • * >sses, the> si iou] < :i b e 
divided or shared equally. 
The appellants' appeal is frivolous and without merit 
and , a c c o r d i n q I  \ ' ,  I, ho .ippel larits shoii hi Ibo r e q u i r e d t^ p a y 
damages, including a reasonable attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BENNION AND COMMERCE HAVE WAIVED OR ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
BY T H I S A P P E A L A N Y E X C E P T I O N OR O K I K C T I O N lV(\ TIIK T R I A L CullUT'S 
There **-*-re T: objections exceptions by tho 
i * *• •*-•.- onclusions of Law either 
within J ii« ; * permitted by the Ru l e s of Pr a c t i c e of the 
District Courts or at any other time prior to the filinq of the 
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appellant's Docketing Statement. By virtue of the failure of 
Bennion and Commerce to have previously raised the issue of the 
insufficiency of evidence to support any conclusion of law, they 
have waived or are estopped from asserting any objections 
thereto. As stated in 3 American Jurisprudence 2nd, "Appeal and 
Error", Section 545, pp.29-30: 
In order to avoid the delay and expense incident to 
appeals, reversals and new trials upon grounds which 
might have been corrected in the trial court if the 
question had been properly raised there, the appellate 
courts have developed and applied the rule that they 
will normally only consider questions which were raised 
and reserved in the lower court and in some 
jurisdictions this principal has been embodied in 
statutes. The reported cases show numerous applications 
of the principle that waiver or estoppel to take 
advantage on appeal of a certain error in the Court 
below may arise from unexcused silence or failure to 
take appropriate action below. The general rule that 
errors not raised below are waived has been applied even 
where the record on appeal contains evidence bearing on 
the matter in question . . . . 
In further support of the above proposition, it is 
stated in 4 Corpus Juris Secundum, "Appeal and Error", Section 
310, pp. 993-942 
As a rule, only objections to the findings of fact or 
conclusions of law, or to the want thereof, which have 
properly been brought to the attention of the trial 
court will be considered on appeal, except where no 
opportunity was given to present the question, or where 
there is a failure to make the findings of fact or 
conclusions of law in support of the judgment as 
required by statute. 
Accordingly, it cannot be objected for the first time on 
appeal that the findings are indefinite or incomplete, 
informal, ambiguous, or not sufficiently specific; . . . 
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POINT IT 
SECTION 48-1-lb, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), AS AMENDED, HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO A JOINT VENTURE 
The !: .i: :i a Jill co\ 1:1 t: foi inci I: .hat the r el ; 1 !:::::„ I onsh 3 p between 
Bennion/Commerce and Hall/PIC was a joint venture. The 
appellants do not dispute this finding. However, the appellants 
submi t: I: .hat the jol nt venture should be deemed a partnership for 
purposes of applying Section 48-1-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended. The said sort im 1 H at f\;i to I In 1 ujht s atid dntim of 
partners and# in pertinent part, to t .he manner i 11 which partners 
shall contribute toward losses of a partnership. 
authority t::< 1 enture is o t treated as 
partnership, enactment ±u X^OD# tn< * * 
declared otherwise Section 48-1-3.1(1) , Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended, defines a joint venture. Section 48-1 -3, 
Utah Code Annotated 1 ](Vi i| „ r, nnrnueci, dhni nines a pa 1 tuer yfi i p. 
The two entities ai e clearly distinguished by statute in that a 
joint venture involves l single business enterprise" whereas a 
partnership 1 n v o 1 v • •. e s s t o 1' p r o t i t" 
Moreover, the Utah Partnership Act (Title 48, Chapter 
1) has limited application t: u m t venture"1; b) irtue nt Section 
4W -1 - i * i <| 2) , Utal» I'udc1 Annotated (1953) as amended. Thereunder, 
the act only "governs the property and transfer rights" of a 
joint venture • As st ated ea 1: ] i er, S ect i o 1 1 4 8 - 3 15 dea 1 s wi th a 
di fferent subject matter, to-wit: the relative rights and duties 
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of partners in a partnership, including the allocation of losses 
between partners. 
If the Utah legislature had wished to cause the Act to 
be generally and comprehensively applied to joint ventures, it 
had every opportunity to do so. Instead, the adopted legislation 
creates a meaningful distinction between joint ventures and 
partnerships and specifies that only certain provisions of the 
act shall apply to joint ventures. Since Section 48-1-15 is not 
one of such provisions, its provisions are irrelevant to this 
case and an improper foundation for the appellants' argument. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND OTHER EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT THE 
CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT BENNION/COMMERCE ARE LIABLE FOR AT LEAST 
FIFTY PERCENT (50%) OF THE JUDGMENT DEBT. 
Finding of Fact No. 3 states that Commerce and Bennion 
"were to receive ten percent (10%) of the total cost of said 
venture" (emphasis added). The appellants would have this Court 
believe, and has taken the liberty to treat as a "fact" of this 
case, the proposition that Bennion/Commerce was a "ten percent 
joint venture partner". As a result of such improper, 
self-serving logic, the appellants further submit that 
Bennion/Commerce had a ten percent (10%) interest in joint 
venture profits. The obvious objective of such reasoning is to 
permit the application of Section 48-1-15, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended, whereunder a partner shall contribute toward 
partnership losses according to his share of partnership profits. 
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However, the appellants' argument is transparent and 
fallacious when it is recognized that they have attempted to 
convert an interest based upon "cost" into an interest in 
"profits". "Cost" may be defined as "the outlay or expenditure 
made to achieve an object." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. 
G.&C. Merriam Company, 1981, p. 255. "Profits" may be variously 
defined as " the excess of returns over outlays", "that sum 
remaining, if any, after all expenses, including salaries or 
wages, were deducted from the amounts realized", or "the excess 
of returns over expenditures in a transaction". Potts v.Lux. 166 
P2d 694, 161 Kan. 217(1946); Duthweiler v. Hansen. 28 P2d 210 
(Idaho 1933); Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. G.& C. Merriam 
Company, 1981, p.912. From the foregoing, it is fundamentally 
obviously that "costs" are an element of "profits", not their 
equivalent. The appellants' interest in the joint venture was 
exclusively related to a "cost" analysis and any discussion of 
"profits" is simply not relevant. 
Further, assuming arguendo that the joint venture 
between Bennion/Commerce and Hall/PIC should be deemed a 
partnership, and that the allocation of profits is a proper 
issue, there is no evidence in the record nor any finding of fact 
by the trial court to suggest any agreement between the parties 
(or even the contemplation of an agreement) regarding a divisions 
of profits or losses. As the only support for their argument, 
appellants cite Finding of Fact No. 3 which, as discussed above, 
does not include any reference to profits, nor imply any 
relationship of the parties based upon profits, nor involve any 
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agreement with regard to profits. Thus, if it is further assumed 
that the obligation to the plaintiff should be deemed a "loss", 
the optimum result to be obtained by Bennion/Commerce would be to 
share the judgment debt. Therefore, applicable rule, as stated 
many years ago by the Utah Supreme Court, is: ". . . (I)n the 
absence of any agreement or proof of an agreement to the 
contrary, the partners will divide the profits and the losses 
equally." Kimball v. McCornick. 259 P. 313 (Utah 1927). 
POINT IV 
THIS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AND WITHOUT MERIT, AND THE RESPONDENTS 
HALL AND PIC SHOULD BE AWARDED DAMAGES, INCLUDING REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
By a convenient distortion of the meaning of essential 
terms, Bennion and Commerce have created an issue where none 
legitimately exists. Although there is no reasonable 
relationship between the concepts of "costs" and "profits", the 
appellants have purposefully misstated the trial court's Findings 
in an unsuccessful effort to make it so appear. 
Inevitably, it becomes obvious that the appellants have 
no basis in fact or law for their appeal and that the appeal is 
merely frivolous. Pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, Hall and PIC should be awarded damages, 
including their reasonable attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants argue that they had a ten percent (10%) 
interest in the profits of the joint venture and, therefore, 
their contribution to the judgment debt should be correspondingly 
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limited to ten percent (10%). They justify this assertion by 
elevating their argument. In truth, no such fact exists nor did 
the lower Court make any such finding. The concept of "profits" 
is not relevant to this case and the appellants' interest in the 
joint venture had absolutely no relationship thereto. Their 
interest was to be determined exclusively with reference to the 
"cost11 of the joint venture project. 
The appellants are grasping for straws and, in so 
doing, have rendered their argument meritless and frivolous. As 
a result, they should be held liable to the respondents for 
damages including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Respectfully submitted this <A)>^ day of September, 
1988. 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
PETER M. ENNENGA 
BRETT D. POULSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents Process Instruments and 
Control, Inc., and John A. Hall 
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